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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[AUGUST

testify that she had not suffered from these afflictions prior to the accident, and then
prevent the only available impeaching testimony from being disclosed, by a claim of
privilege, it would seem that a mockery is being made of justice, and we do not think
our statute contemplates such a condition
" This expression, if it represents the
new attitude of the court toward the statute, calls for a re-appraisal of the case of
Neolle v. Hoqutam. Lumber & Shingle Co., 47 Wash. 519, 92 Pac.372 (1907). Cf.
Wesseler v. Great Northern R. Co., 90 Wash. 234, 157 Pac. 461 (1916). In the Noelle
case the court held that where the P takes the stand and describes his injuries as to
their cause and extent, he does not waive the privilege as to any physician who attnded him for such alleged injuries. The danger in this type of situation is that a naked
fraud may be perpetrated under the guise of legality. As was forcefully stated by
Judge Root in the dissenting opinion in the Neolle case, the secrets of the sick room
having been voluntarily exposed by the P, the reason for the privilege no longer
obtains. Invoking the privilege at this stage of the proceedings is to use the privilege
"as a sword instead of as a shield." Professor Wigmore has this comment to make:
"Certainly it is a spectacle fit to increase the layman's traditional contempt for the chicanery of the law when a plaintiff describes at length to the jury and a crowded court
room the details of his supposed ailment, and then neatly suppresses the available proof
of his falsities by wielding a weapon nominally termed a privilege." 8 WxIMoaE, EvIDENCE § 2389 3rd ed. (1940). The language of the principal case indicates that the
Washington court is beginning to take cognizance of the realities of the situation.
The patient-physician privilege, if not strictly confined, results in an unwarranted obstruction to the attainment of substantial justice. P comes into court seeking to recover damages for personal injuries, yet the amount of damages that can properly be
awarded is dependent upon Ps physical condition both prior and subsequent to the accident.
Some jurisdictions, notably New York, have approached a satisfactory solution.
Examples are Heithser v. Johns, 233 N.Y. 370, 135 N.E. 603 (1922), holding testimony of plaintiff alone as to his physical condition and past medical treatment may
waive the privilege and Apter v. Home Life Insurance Co., 266 N.Y. 333, 194 N.E.
846 (1935), holding that in action on a policy of disability insurance, defendant may
call plaintiff's physician to testify as to whether the disease originated or became evident prior to issuance of policy.
A more realistic solution is the method that has been tried and proved in California
of amending the statute itself. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., §1881 (Deenng 1948). See
Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound Lines 28 Cal.2d 357, 170 P.2d 465 (1946).
If the Washington statute could be similarly amended it would be a long overdue
legislative advancement. Such an amendment could be to the effect that where any
person brings an action to recover damages for personal injuries or brings any civil
action where his or her physical condition is materially in issue, such action shall be
deemed to constitute a consent by the person bringing such action that any physician
who has prescribed for, treated or examined said person and whose testimony is material shall be competent to testify.
JAmEs F McATaa

Evidence-Cross Examination of Defendant's Character Witnesses--Scope. D was
convicted of second degree burglary. During the cross examination of three character
witnesses for the defense, the prosecuting attorney asked, over the objections of the
defense, the following questions: "Did you know that in 1941 D had is operator's
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license suspended?", "Did you know that D spent twelve days in jail and was fined
twenty-five dollars for drunkenness on January 10, 1949?" and "Did you know D was
given twenty days fdr vagrancy in the city jail of Walla Walla?" Held: The form of
the questions was proper as long as it was not for the purpose of discerditing the person on trial. State v. Cyr, 40 Wn. 2d 840, 246 P2d 480 (1952).
The holding in the instant case puts Washington among the small minority of states
which allow the prosecution to ask, on cross-examination of defendant's character witness, whether such witness has any personal knowledge of specific acts of misconduct committed by the defendant. State v. Jacobs, 195 La. 281, 196 So. 347 (1940). The
Washington cases which support the minority rule and upon which the court relied
in the instant case are State v. Austin, 83 Wash. 444, 145 Pac. 451 (1915) and State v.
Stilts, 181 Wash. 305, 42 P. 2d 779 (1935). In these cases the court held that questions
asked of character witnesses as to their knowledge of specific acts of the accused were
within the bounds of legitimate cross-examination as long as the purpose was only to
discredit the testimony of the witness. See also State v. McMullen, 142 Wash. 7, 252
Pac. 108 (1927) ; State v. Bosozich, 145 Wash. 227, 259 Pac. 395 (1927) ; cf. State v.
Coates, 22 Wash. 601, 61 Pac. 726 (1900) (testimony as to general reputation alone
allowed).
The majority rule allows the prosecution to cross-examine defendant's character witnesses only as to rumors or reports of particular acts of misconduct committed by the
defendant. Stewart v. United States, 104 F.2d 234 (App. D.C. 1939); Michelson v.
United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) ; State v. Miller,60 Ida. 79, 88 P. 2d 526 (1939) ; 3
WIGUORE, EVIENCE § 988 (3rd ed. 1940). In the Michelson case, the basis for the
majority rule was concisely explained by Mr. Justice Jackson: "Since the whole inquiry,... is calculated to ascertain the general talk of people about defendant, rather
than the witness' own knowledge of. him, the form of inquiry 'Have you heard?' has
general approval, and 'Do you -know' is not allowed. . it is not the man that he is,
but the name that he has which is put in issue."
The form of inquiry, "Do you know?" indicates to the jury that the prosecutor has
definite information that the defendant has been guilty of a series of offenses by not
in any way distinguishing between rumor and fact of such offenses. This results in
prejudicing the accused in the mind of the jury. It is suggested that the form of qu stion allowed by the majority, "Have you heard?," keeps the prosecution within the
stated purpose of cross-examination of character witnesses and lessens the chance of
prejudicing the defendant in the mind of the jury by minimizing references to the fact
that the defendant has been guilty of prior acts of misconduct.
MIcHAEL. MINEs

Insurance--Conafict of Interests--Bad Faith of Insurer. P, the insured under a public
liability insurance policy with D, had been sued by an injured party; one of the grounds
alleged for recovery was expressly excepted by the terms of the policy. D insisted on
its policy right to control the defense and also to withdraw and disclaim all liability if
at the trial the loss was found to be outside the policy coverage. P objected to the reservation of rights by D, pointing out that it would be to D's interest at the trial to allow proof of the loss on grounds outside the policy coverage and thus escape all liability. D then offered to allow P's counsel to assist in the defense and P accepted. P,
subject to potential liability in excess of the policy's limits, negotiated a settlement
within the policy's limits, to which D refused to contribute. P paid the settlement and

